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INTRODUCTION 
In Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
“death penalty must be imposed fairly and with reasonable 
consistency, or not at all.”1 It is “indisputable fact that more than 
twenty years after the Court’s opinion in Furman v. Georgia, the 
death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, 
caprice, and mistake.”2 And yet, currently in the U.S., thirty-two 
states and the federal government continue to use capital punishment.3 
Out of at least 1,280 state executions in the U.S. since 1976,4 more 
than 1,000 occurred in the South, with the remaining numbers across 
the Midwest, West, and Northeast.5 Texas alone accounts for more 
than 500 of these executions.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239 (1972) (per curiam)); accord Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).  
2 William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreword: Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1994) (citing Callins, 510 U.S. at 1144) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 
21, 2014).  
4 See Peter Applebome, In Connecticut Vote, Death Penalty Critics Don’t See 
Major Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/nyregion/death-penalty-critics-dont-see-
nationwide-shift-in-connecticut-vote.html?ref=connecticut. 
5 See Number of Executions by State and Region, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-
1976 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
6 Id. Also, since 1988 (when the federal death penalty was reinstated), the 
federal government has pursued capital punishment for about 500 defendants. Only 
three of those defendants have been executed, however, and the last execution 
occurred at least a decade ago. Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. Weighs Pursuit of Death 
Penalty for Suspect in Boston Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/us-weighs-pursuit-of-death-penalty-in-
boston-bombing.html?hpw&rref=us&_r=0. 
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However, recent years signal a hopeful shift in public opinion as 
more states are abolishing capital punishment. 7  In April 2012, 
Connecticut Governor Dannel P. Malloy signed into law a repeal of 
the state’s death penalty, making Connecticut the seventeenth state—
and the fifth state since 2007—to abandon capital punishment.8 The 
repeal replaces the death penalty with life in prison without the 
possibility of parole, but only prospectively, not retroactively.9 This 
means that those who committed a capital offense before the repeal’s 
effective date could still be sentenced to death and executed today.10 
Currently Connecticut houses eleven adult males on death row.11  
At issue is whether, under the Eighth Amendment, Connecticut 
can impose capital punishment after repealing it prospectively. This 
issue may grow as more states like Connecticut find prospective 
repeal easier to pass than complete abolition. When Connecticut 
prospectively repealed its death penalty, New Mexico was the only 
other state to have done so (in 2011).12 Maryland then joined the list 
in 2013.13 
The death penalty might be per se constitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment, but the U.S. Supreme Court continues to closely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The death penalty is being abolished in states where executions are not actually 
occurring. Though, unfortunately, it remains largely untouched where executions 
are active. Applebome, supra note 4. 
8 Lincoln Caplan, A Trial on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/opinion/sunday/a-trial-on-death-row.html. 
9 See 2012 Conn. Pub. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.) (under “Public Act No. 12-5”), S.B. 




10 See infra note 39.  
11 Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.ct.gov/doc/cwp/view.asp?q=265472 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) 
[hereinafter Conn. Dep’t of Corr. FAQ].  
12 States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 3. 
13 Id.; see S.B. 276, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 5 (Md. 2013) 
(amending §§ 7-601, 7-201 to repeal death sentencing procedures), available at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=su
bject3&id=SB0276&ys=2013RS. 
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monitor capital punishment cases for constitutional violations. 14 
Connecticut’s prospective death penalty repeal would probably 
survive an Eighth Amendment challenge.15 But its prospective nature 
resulted from political compromise.16 The repeal is a step in the right 
direction, but it is nonetheless unsettling that lawmakers are giving up 
lives now to ensure the abolition of capital punishment in the future. 
I. CONNECTICUT’S DEATH PENALTY AND THE CURRENT STATE OF 
THE LAW 
A. Conditions Leading Up to Repeal and the Donohue Study 
Capital punishment in Connecticut began in 1639.17 From 1639 
to 2005, Connecticut performed a total of 127 executions using 
different methods over time, first from hanging, then the electric chair 
(until 1973), and finally lethal injection (current form).18 But in the 
last half century, Connecticut executed only one person: Michael 
Bruce Ross, a serial killer who voluntarily gave up on appeals and 
was executed in 2005, which made him the first person to be executed 
in Connecticut since 1960.19 
Stanford Law professor John Donohue recently conducted a 
comprehensive study of Connecticut’s death penalty; the findings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (finding the death penalty to 
be per se constitutional). 
15 See infra pp. 15-30. 
16 See infra pp. 30-34 (discussing how some lawmakers conditioned their 
support of repeal on it being prospectively applied).  
17 CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., 
OLR RESEARCH REPORT 0321: DEATH PENALTY 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/pdf/2012-R-0321.pdf; Peter Applebome, Death 
Penalty Repeal Goes to Connecticut Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/nyregion/connecticut-house-votes-to-repeal-
death-penalty.html?pagewanted=all. Capital crimes historically included murder, 
witchcraft, and blasphemy. REINHART, supra note 17, at 4.  
18 Applebome, supra note 17; Executions in Connecticut Since 1894, CONN. 
STATE LIBRARY, http://www.cslib.org/executions.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
19 See Applebome, supra note 17.  
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provide further insight.20 As Connecticut is a relatively small state, the 
Donohue study analyzed every capital murder case from 1973 (when 
Connecticut reinstated the death penalty) to 2007. The study found 
that “[t]he extreme infrequency with which the death penalty [was] 
administered in Connecticut raise[d] a serious question as to whether 
the state’s death penalty regime [was] serving any legitimate social 
purpose.”21 It examined whether Connecticut’s capital punishment 
system operates lawfully and reasonably, or whether this system is 
tainted with arbitrariness, caprice, or discrimination. The study 
findings suggest that those sentenced to death are not necessarily the 
“worst of the worst.”22  
Specifically, of the 4,686 murders committed in Connecticut 
during the thirty-four year period, 205 convicted murderers were 
death-eligible, meaning they committed murders that included at least 
one aggravating circumstance.23 Nearly a third, forty-nine, of these 
205 were not prosecuted as capital offenses; only sixty-six were 
convicted of capital murder; twenty-eight went to a death penalty 
sentencing hearing; nine sentences were sustained; and one person 
was executed (in 2005).24  
Overall, the Donohue study resulted in seven main findings.25 
First, Connecticut sustained death sentences for only nine of the 205 
death-eligible offenders, which resulted in a 4.4% rate of imposing 
the death sentence.26  This rate is among the lowest in the nation.27 To 
put this in perspective, the Supreme Court suggested that a 15% rate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See generally JOHN J. DONOHUE III, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, NAT’L BUREAU 
OF ECON. RESEARCH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973-2007: A 
COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 1 (2013), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/87/. 
21 Id. (original emphasis). 
22 Id. at 5.  
23 Id. at 1. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 3. 
26 Id. at 4. 
27 Id.  
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in pre-Furman Georgia meant the death penalty was “freakishly rare,” 
and therefore arbitrarily imposed and unconstitutional.28  
Second, by using an “egregiousness” ratings system to compare 
all 205 death-eligible cases, the study found that the cases prosecuted 
as capital murders were not necessarily “more egregious” than those 
not prosecuted as capital murders.29 In other words, the study found 
no meaningful basis in Connecticut for distinguishing the very few 
inmates who did receive death sentences from the many death-eligible 
murderers who did not.30  Such a finding contradicts arguments from 
death penalty proponents that the relative infrequency of death 
sentences demonstrates “the humane feeling that this most irrevocable 
of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme 
cases.”31 
Third, at every level of egregiousness, defendants received a 
wide range of sentences. For instance, only one of Connecticut’s nine 
sustained death sentences was among the 15 cases with the highest 
egregiousness ratings.32  
Fourth, the sample of 205 death-eligible cases likely 
understated the degree of arbitrariness in the system that may be 
revealed if all death-eligible murders in the state’s history were taken 
into account.33 Fifth, the study found the capital punishment system to 
be discriminatory because when the victim was white and defendants 
were Hispanic or non-white, those defendants were significantly more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 5. The study considered four factors: victim suffering (e.g., duration of 
pain); victim characteristics (e.g., age); defendant’s culpability (e.g., motive, 
intoxication); and the number of victims. Id.at 102. The study omitted the official 
case names, outcomes, and the race of the defendants or victims. Students from two 
law schools used the four factors to rate each case on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being 
the most egregious. Id.at 103-104, n. 209. The study also allowed participants to 
rate the overall egregiousness of each case on a scale of 1 to 5 to capture the general 
subjective reaction of each participant. Id.at 103. 
30 See id.at 3-4.  
31 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 239, 388 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting)). 
32 See DONOHUE, supra note 20, at 5. 
33 Id.at 6. 
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likely to receive death sentences than white defendants.34 Sixth, after 
receiving a death sentence, defendants who had murdered white 
victims were more likely to be executed than were those who 
murdered non-white victims, especially if the defendants themselves 
were minorities.35 Finally, the study found arbitrariness based on 
geography, as death-eligible defendants in Waterbury, Connecticut 
were sentenced to death at much higher rates than were death-eligible 
defendants elsewhere in the state.36  
By showing the Connecticut death penalty’s arbitrary use in 
recent decades, the Donohue study helped lay the groundwork for the 
legislature to abolish capital punishment. On April 25, 2012, 
Connecticut Governor Dannel P. Malloy signed into law a repeal of 
Connecticut’s death penalty, making it the seventeenth state without 
capital punishment.37 Connecticut also became the fifth state since 
2007 to repeal its death penalty, joining New Jersey (2007), New 
York (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), and Maryland 
(2013).38 
But Connecticut’s repeal abolished the death penalty only for 
future capital crimes, not for capital offenses committed before the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id.at 7. 
35 Id. at 7-8. 
36 Id.at 8.  
37 Caplan, supra note 8. 
38 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 3; see also With 
Senate Vote, Connecticut Is on Track to End Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/nyregion/death-penalty-repeal-bill-
passes-connecticut-senate.html [hereinafter Connecticut on Track]. 
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repeal’s effective date.39 This means that a defendant who committed 
a capital offense before April 25, 2012 could still be sentenced to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(a) (2012) provides: “A person shall be subjected 
to the penalty of death for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012 . . . 
only if a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section.”: 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-45(a) (2012) provides: “Murder is 
punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) 
of section 53a-35a, unless it is a capital felony committed prior to 
April 25, 2012, punishable in accordance with subparagraph (A) 
of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, murder with special 
circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, punishable as 
a class A felony in accordance with subparagraph (B) of 
subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, or murder under section 53a-
54d.” In other words, murder is a class A felony (maximum of 
life) unless the death sentence is imposed under § 53a-46.  
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-35a (2012) provides: “For any felony 
committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment 
shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of the general 
statutes that defines the crime specifically provides otherwise, the 
term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) (A) For a capital 
felony committed prior to April 25, 2012 under the provisions of 
section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a term of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence 
of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a, or (B) for 
the class A felony of murder with special circumstances 
committed on or after April 25, 2012 under the provisions of 
section 53a-54b in effect on or after April 25, 2012, a term of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release[.]”;  
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2012) (defining capital felony, or 
“murder with special circumstances,” as (1) murder of a public 
officer, (2) murder for hire, (3) murder when defendant had 
previously been convicted of murder or felony-murder, (4) murder 
when defendant was serving a sentence of life imprisonment, (5) 
murder during the course of a kidnapping, (6) murder 
accompanied by first-degree sexual assault, (7) murder of two or 
more persons at the same time, or (8) murder of a person under 
sixteen years of age); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a–46b(a) (2012) 
(providing for automatic review of death sentences by state 
Vol. 10.1]   Suchitra Paul  	  
	  288 
capital punishment and executed today. Accordingly, Connecticut 
continues to maintain its death row, which now houses eleven adult 
males.40  
B. Current State of the Law of Prospective Death Penalty Repeals 
Other than Connecticut, New Mexico and Maryland are the 
only states to have prospectively repealed the death penalty while 
keeping their existing death row intact.41 New Jersey’s legislature 
completely abolished the death penalty in 2007 by repealing all 
statutory provisions concerning capital punishment. 42  Illinois’s 
legislature completely abolished the death penalty in 2011 and 
redirected all capital punishment funds to the families of homicide or 
murder victims and the training of law enforcement personnel.43 
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn then commuted the sentences of the 
fifteen inmates on death row to life without parole.44 The New York 
Court of Appeals found New York’s death penalty statute to be 
unconstitutional in 2004, and lawmakers have not since moved to 
amend or reinstate it.45 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supreme Court in conjunction with direct appeal); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-100 (2012) (providing that the method of inflicting the 
death penalty shall be by lethal injection). 
40 Conn. Dep’t of Corr. FAQ, supra note 11. 
41 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 3.  
42 See N.J. STAT. § 2C:11-3 (2007) (amended to delete current statutory 
subsections c. through h., effectively eliminating the death penalty and replacing it 
with life imprisonment without eligibility for parole in certain circumstances); see 
also N.J. STAT. §§ 2A:165-1 to 2A:165-12 (2007); N.J. STAT. §§ 2C:49-1 to 2C:49-
12 (2007) (repealed by L.2007, c. 204, § 7, eff. Dec. 17, 2007). 
43 2011 Ill. Laws 7778-79 (Reg. Sess.) (under “Public Act 96-1543”), S.B. 3539, 
96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=096-1543. 
44 Ray Long, Quinn Signs Death Penalty Ban, Commutes 15 Death Row 
Sentences to Life, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2011, 12:41 PM), 
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2011/03/quinn-signs-death-penalty-
ban-commutes-15-death-row-sentences-to-life.html. 
45 See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 368 (N.Y. 2004); see also People v. 
Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 979 (N.Y. 2007); Applebome, supra note 17. 
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In contrast, New Mexico’s repeal, effective since July 1, 2009, 
mirrors Connecticut’s prospective repeal and benefits only those who 
committed aggravated first-degree murder on or after the repeal’s 
effective date.46 New Mexico’s death row houses two inmates whose 
sentences went unchanged.47 Like Connecticut, at the time of the 
repeal, New Mexico had executed only one person since it reinstated 
the death penalty in 1979.48 
Maryland, the first state south of the Mason-Dixon Line to 
abolish capital punishment, also prospectively repealed its death 
penalty, beginning October 1, 2013.49 The repeal did not apply to the 
four men on Maryland’s death row, but in 2014 Maryland governor 
Martin O’Malley commuted these remaining death sentences to life 
without parole.50 But, unlike New Mexico and Connecticut, Maryland 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See H.B. 285, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009), available at 
http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/final/HB0285.pdf (abolishing the 
death penalty but providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he provisions of this act apply 
to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009.”).  
47 See Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/us/19execute.html.  
48 See Number of Executions by State and Region, supra note 5. Child killer 
Terry Clark was executed in New Mexico in 2001. Death Penalty Is Repealed in 
New Mexico, supra note 47. Before signing the prospective repeal into law, New 
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson expressed concerns about the high costs of death 
penalty litigation and the burden on the state budget, in addition to the unnerving 
frequency with which wrongful convictions occurred. Ian Urbina, Citing Costs, 
States Consider End to Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/us/25death.html?pagewanted=all. 
49 See S.B. 276, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Md. 2013), available 
at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=su
bject3&id=SB0276&ys=2013RS; see also Maryland Abolishes Death Penalty as 
Governor Signs Bill into Law, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/02/maryland-abolishes-death-
penalty-governor-law [hereinafter Maryland Governor Signs Bill]. 
50 See Alan Blinder, Life Sentences for Last Four Facing Death in Maryland, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/01/us/maryland-
governor-omalley-commutes-death-sentences-emptying-death-
row.html?ref=us&_r=0; S.B. 276, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Md. 
2013) (amending § 7-601), available at 
Vol. 10.1]   Suchitra Paul  	  
	  290 
does not allow any new death sentences, regardless of when the 
offense was committed relative to the repeal’s effective date. 51 
Maryland’s last execution occurred in 2005.52 
1. The Case of New Mexico: State v. Astorga 
Whether prospective repeal violates the Eighth Amendment 
would be an issue of first impression in both Connecticut and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Thus far, the only state to decide the issue is New 
Mexico.53 (The Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Santiago, 
recently refused to overrule its past decisions that the death penalty is 
per se constitutional, but it did not address the constitutionality of 
prospective repeal on point.54 
In State of New Mexico v. Astorga, defendant Michael Astorga 
faced charges for the highly publicized 2006 murder of a police 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=su
bject3&id=SB0276&ys=2013RS; Maryland Governor Signs Bill, supra note 49.  
51 S.B. 276, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Md. 2013) (amending § 2-
201 to repeal death sentencing procedure), available at 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=su
bject3&id=SB0276&ys=2013RS.  
52 Capital Punishment History: Persons Executed in Maryland Since 1923, MD. 
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, 
http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/capitalpunishment/demographics_persons1
923.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
53 See Alaine Griffin, Death Penalty Repeal Changes the Legal Landscape, 
HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 13, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-
13/news/hc-death-penalty-repeal-impact-0415-20120413_1_death-row-death-
penalty-julia-ashe/2. 
54 See State of Connecticut v. Eduardo Santiago (SC 17413) (Conn. 2012), 
available at 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROCR/CR305/305CR121.pdf; see 
also Case Detail: State of Connecticut v. Eduardo Santiago, CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://appellateinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail.aspx?CRN=11507&Type=PartyName 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2014). Defendant Eduardo Santiago was convicted of capital 
felony and sentenced to death for participating in a murder-for-hire scheme in 2000. 
See Case Description: State v. Eduardo Santiago, SC 17413, JUD. DIST. OF 
HARTFORD, available at http://blog.ctbriefsonline.com/?p=2164.  
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officer during a traffic stop.55 In 2010—after the state repealed capital 
punishment—a jury convicted Astorga of first-degree murder. 56 
Before and during sentencing, Astorga challenged New Mexico’s 
prospective death penalty repeal under the Eighth Amendment, 
arguing that the repeal “sets forth an evolved standard of decency 
which makes it Cruel and Unusual Punishment . . . to impose the 
Death Penalty.”57 But the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to 
make the repeal retroactive; in 2011, it ruled that a jury could consider 
the death penalty. 58 Also, in the past, New Mexico courts have 
recognized that the legislature is “invested with plenary legislative 
power”59 such that “the power to define crimes and to establish 
criminal penalties is exclusively a legislative function.”60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Barry Massey, N.M. Supreme Court to Consider Astorga Case, Death Penalty 
Repeal, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 18, 2011, 4:56 
PM), http://www.abqjournal.com/50999/news/state-supreme-court-to-look-at-death-
penalty-in-astorga-case.html. 
56 See id.  
57 Petitioner’s Brief at 9, Astorga v. Candelaria, No. 33,152 (N.M. Aug. 26, 
2011); accord Kevin Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part I): The Eighth Amendment 
Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 66 FLA. L. REV. 313, 317-19 
(2014). 
58 Russell Contreras, Astorga Death Penalty Case Will Proceed, LAS CRUCES 
SUN-NEWS (Sept. 2, 2011, 3:36 AM), http://www.lcsun-news.com/las_cruces-
news/ci_18809641.  
59 State v. Thompson, 260 P.2d 370, 374 (N.M. 1953) (noting that defining 
crime and prescribing punishment are legislative functions). 
60 State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1197 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). The New 
Mexico Supreme Court elaborated in Thompson:  
 
It is no part of the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom, 
the policy, or the justness of an act of the legislature. Our duty is 
to ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature, and to give 
effect to the legislative will as expressed in the laws. Every 
legislative act comes before this court surrounded with the 
presumption of constitutionality, and this presumption continues 
until the act under review clearly appears to contravene some 
provision of the Constitution. The courts are by the constitution 
not made critics of the legislature, but rather guardians of the 
Constitution; and, though the courts might have a doubt as to the 
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 The Connecticut Supreme Court might follow New Mexico’s 
lead. Connecticut even recognized that “the New Mexico ban is 
prospective only and no clemency has been granted to convicted 
capital offenders, leaving that state’s existing death row intact. Given 
that circumstance, it is unlikely that the New Mexico legislature was 
convinced that the death penalty is intolerable under any and all 
circumstances.”61 But, even if the ruling of the New Mexico Supreme 
Court could be persuasive, Connecticut courts are not bound to follow 
it.62 
2. Connecticut Precedent: Dortch v. State 
In the past, Connecticut enforced prospective amendments to its 
death penalty statutes—Dortch v. State is one such example. In 1951, 
the Connecticut legislature prospectively amended § 8351 of the 
state’s death penalty statute. 63  Before the amendment, the death 
penalty was mandatory for first-degree murder convictions.64 After 
the amendment, a jury could impose either the death penalty or life in 
prison without parole for first-degree murder.65 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constitutionality of the legislative act, all such doubts must be 
resolved in favor of the law. 
 
Thompson, 260 P.2d at 374 (internal citations omitted). 
61 State v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094, 1167 n. 88 (Conn. 2011). 
62See State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 840 (Conn. 2010) (reasoning that in 
construing the contours of the state constitution, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
looks to decisions of other state courts only as persuasive authority); Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 421 (Conn. 2008) (reasoning that sister-state 
decisions are one of six factors the Connecticut Supreme Court considers when 
construing the contours of the Connecticut constitution—as provided by State v. 
Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685 (Conn. 1992)—but also that “not every Geisler factor 
is relevant in all cases.”) (citations omitted). 
63 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2463c (Supp. 1953) (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
8351); see also Dortch v. State, 110 A.2d 471, 475-76 (Conn. 1954). 
64 See GEN. § 2463c; see also Dortch, 110 A.2d at 476.  
65 See GEN. § 2463c; see also Dortch, 110 A.2d at 475-76. 
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In Dortch v. State, a jury convicted a man of first-degree murder 
in 1950 (before the amendment’s effective date of October 1, 1951).66 
The conviction automatically subjected him to the death penalty. 
After the amendment passed, he argued on appeal that he was denied 
equal protection and due process in violation of the state and federal 
constitutions because those who committed murder on the same day, 
but who were tried and sentenced after October 1, 1951, might 
“escape with life imprisonment.”67 The Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that, because the legislature “expressed no intent that [the 
amendment] should operate retrospectively,” the amendment had no 
retrospective effect.68  
Because the petitioner committed his capital offense before the 
amendment’s effective date, he could not benefit from the new 
amendment: 
As the law now stands, the penalty for all first degree 
murders committed prior to October 1, 1951 is death; 
for all first degree murders committed thereafter, the 
penalty is either death or life imprisonment. It follows 
that the [petitioner] is being treated in exactly the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Dortch, 110 A.2d at 472, 476. On September 3, 1949, the petitioner, while 
intoxicated, attacked his former lover and stabbed her 23 times with a hunting knife 
until she died. Id. at 473-74. He then fled the scene, hid behind a stone wall nearby, 
and attempted to kill himself. Id. at 474. Petitioner in guilt proceedings testified that 
soon after the murder, he surrendered at a police station. Id. at 474-75. 
67 Id. at 476. 
68 Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8872 (1949) (now CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
194), which provides: “The repeal of any statute defining or prescribing the 
punishment for any crime shall not affect any pending prosecution or any existing 
liability to prosecution and punishment therefor, unless expressly provided in the 
repealing statute that such repeal shall have that effect.”); see also CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 8890 (1949) (now CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1(t) (1949), which provides: “The 
repeal of an act shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred 
before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, or prosecution, or proceeding pending at 
the time of the repeal, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or 
forfeiture incurred under the act repealed.”). 
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manner as all others who committed murder in the first 
degree prior to October 1, 1951.69 
Thus, the petitioner’s death sentence was mandatory, regardless 
of when the trial or sentencing occurred.70 The court held that the 
petitioner received equal protection of the laws and had not been 
denied due process.71 
Similarly, a Connecticut court today might apply Dortch to 
those who committed a capital offense before April 25, 2012. Just as 
the 1951 amendment was not explicitly retroactive, the 2012 repeal is 
not explicitly retroactive. 72  Also, the 2012 repeal, like the 1951 
amendment, allows capital offenders a new option of life 
imprisonment instead of death row. 
But a Connecticut court today could very well stray from 
Dortch for several reasons. First, Dortch addressed a claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, so it is merely 
persuasive, not binding, authority. 73  Second, Dortch’s 1951 
amendment allowed either the death penalty or life imprisonment for 
offenses committed on or after its effective date;74  here, the 2012 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Dortch, 110 A.2d at 476-77. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 477. The Connecticut Supreme Court also cited a 1936 case, Simborski 
v. Wheeler, 183 A. 688 (Conn. 1936), which held that the petitioner—who was 
sentenced to be hanged before the state changed its method of execution to 
electrocution—could still lawfully be hanged because the repealed statute remained 
in full effect. Dortch, 110 A.2d at 476.  
72 See generally 2012 Conn. Pub. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.) (under “Public Act No. 




(last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
73 See Dortch, 110 A.2d at 475-76; see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 79 
(2006) (reasoning that as a general rule, stare decisis “directs [the Court] to adhere 
not only to the holdings of . . . prior cases, but also [to] their explications of the 
governing rules of law”) (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 490 
(1986)). 
74 See Dortch, 110 A.2d at 475-76. 
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repeal takes the death penalty off the table altogether. Third, times 
have changed: the 2012 prospective repeal shows that public opinion 
in Connecticut is less accepting of the death penalty today than it was 
in the 1950s.75 So, while the 1951 amendment and the 2012 repeal 
may be structurally similar, based on Dortch, a Connecticut court 
would not be bound to uphold the 2012 repeal against defendants like 
the eleven inmates on death row under the Eighth Amendment.  
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
 Connecticut’s prospective death penalty repeal would 
probably survive an Eighth Amendment challenge. The Eighth 
Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”76 Even after repeal, a court would likely find that the death 
penalty is a proportional, not “cruel and unusual,” punishment in 
Connecticut because (1) the state’s death penalty statute aims to 
achieve consistent, individualized sentencing; and (2) the remaining 
death row inmates would likely not be treated as a special class of 
offenders exempt from capital punishment. 77  But the prospective 
nature of the repeal came from political compromise. While the 2012 
repeal shows progress, it is nevertheless troubling that lawmakers are 
giving up lives now to abolish capital punishment in the future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1378 (Conn. 1994) (reasoning that “public 
opinion must be gleaned from a society’s actual record in carrying out the death 
penalty”). 
76 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “Cruel and unusual” was lifted from the English 
Bill of Rights of 1688. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443-44, 446 (1890) (citing 
1 St. Wm. & Mary, c. 2 (Eng.)). The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States 
by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
675 (1962). If a state supreme court affirms the validity of the prospective repeal of 
the death penalty, a federal court cannot disturb its judgment unless it finds “some 
right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was denied[.]” Howard v. Fleming, 191 
U.S. 126, 135 (1903). 
77 See infra pp. 17-30. 
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A. Central to the Eighth Amendment: Proportionality 
Because the words “cruel and unusual” are not precise, the U.S. 
Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment in “a flexible and 
dynamic manner” as shifting public opinion becomes “enlightened by 
a humane justice.”78 Cruel and unusual punishment easily includes 
“inherently barbaric punishments” such as torture.79 However, the 
concern with torture is more about prohibiting excessive punishment 
than pain: 
[W]hy do we, and why did the Framers care so much 
about pain? . . . The true significance of the 
thumbscrew, of the iron boot, of the stretching of 
limbs, is that they treat members of the human race as 
nonhumans, as objects to be hurt and then discarded. . . 
. Mutilations and tortures are not unconstitutional 
merely because they are painful—they would not, I 
submit, be saved from unconstitutionality by having 
the convicted person sufficiently anesthetized such that 
no physical pain were felt; rather, they are 
unconstitutional because they are inconsistent with the 
fundamental premise of the [E]ighth [A]mendment that 
even the vilest criminal remains a human being 
possessed of common human dignity.80 
Thus, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment is about 
“guarantee[ing] individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive 
sanctions.”81  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (quoting Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)); accord Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) 
(plurality opinion). 
79 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 
136 (1878). 
80 Brennan, supra note 2, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 
(2002); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
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Freedom from excessive sanctions “flows from the basic 
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be proportioned to 
both the offender and the offense.”82 For instance, the state cannot 
impose capital punishment for a petty crime or fine, or imprison 
someone for being sick.83 Put simply, proportional punishment is 
central to the Eighth Amendment.84 Proportionality breaks down into 
two paths of Eighth Amendment analysis.85  
1. Proportionality I: Procedural Safeguards for Consistency and 
Individualization 
First, proportionality prohibits the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of punishment by requiring procedural safeguards to guide 
the discretion of sentencing authorities.86 For example, the Court in 
Furman v. Georgia invalidated capital sentencing procedures that, 
due to their lack of specificity, created a substantial risk that the death 
penalty would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.87  
The Georgia death penalty statute in Furman was problematic 
because it failed to mention any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances that allowed juries to “reach a finding of the 
defendant’s guilt and then, without any guidance or direction, decide 
whether he should live or die.”88 While the Supreme Court does not 
prescribe any single structure for capital punishment systems, states 
must avoid arbitrary and capricious capital punishment, at least, by 
focusing the discretion of sentencing authorities.89 “[T]he concerns 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962). 
84 Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 59). 
85 Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-61 (2010). 
86 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302-04 (1987); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 239, 256, 274 (1972) (Douglas, J. and Brennan, J., concurring) (per 
curiam).  
87 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.   
88  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) . 
89 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (“As the Court several 
times has made clear, we are unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a 
State to set up its capital sentencing scheme.”). 
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expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted 
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate 
information and guidance.90  
 To ensure that sentencing authorities will not have 
unconstitutionally unbridled discretion, capital punishment statutes 
must meet the dual requirements of consistency and individualized 
consideration.91 To achieve consistency in sentencing, a state must 
statutorily narrow the pool of persons eligible for death row by either 
(1) narrowly defining capital offenses (e.g., homicide through an 
intentional mail-bombing) or (2) broadly stating the offense but 
providing a finite list of aggravating circumstances (any one of which 
could make a defendant death-eligible).92 For instance, a statute could 
require that at least one aggravating circumstance be found before the 
death penalty could be imposed.93 And an aggravating circumstance 
might be that the capital offense occurred during a burglary or arson, 
or that it involved the murder of a police officer, judge, or district 
attorney.94 
Then, when choosing who from the pool of death-eligible 
defendants will receive capital punishment, the sentencing authority 
must give each defendant individualized consideration by weighing 
the aggravating circumstances with any statutory or non-statutory 
mitigating circumstances (e.g., the character and record of the 
individual offender, the circumstances of the particular offense, 
etc.).95  Sentencing authorities must consider the individual’s personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.  
91 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008). 
92 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 
U.S. 231, 231 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994).  
93 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 302 (1990); see also Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 198. 
94 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198. 
95 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 436; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that in any capital case, a defendant has wide latitude to 
raise any aspect of his or her character or record as a mitigating circumstance that 
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history and the full scope of the offense before delivering a death 
sentence. 96  The Court provides no rules for how to balance 
aggravating with mitigating circumstances in capital sentencing.97 But 
to further promote individual consideration, the Court recommends 
that states use bifurcated hearing approach that addresses guilt and 
sentencing in separate proceedings.98 Moreover, because the death 
penalty is “unique in its severity and irrevocability,” the Court 
requires that it be “reserved for a small number of extreme cases.”99  
Here, the Court would likely find Connecticut’s current capital 
punishment statute sufficient to achieve consistency and 
individualization. In State v. Ross, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the state’s death penalty statute (pre-
repeal).100 The court approved Connecticut’s sentencing procedure, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
offers a basis for a sentence less than death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
96 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012); see also Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) 
(quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, for the proposition that considering mitigating 
evidence is a “constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the 
penalty of death”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (“[The] qualitative difference between 
death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death 
sentence is imposed.”); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (holding that the Constitution 
mandates “particularized consideration” of the offender’s character and record 
before the death sentence can be imposed). 
97 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2330 (1998) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that the Court has “never held that a specific method for balancing mitigating and 
aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required”). 
98 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (“As a general proposition, [the concerns of Furman] 
are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the 
sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of 
sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of information.”).  
99 See id. at 187, 181 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 382 (1972) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)); accord Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 436-37; Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 568 (2005); see also Brown, 479 U.S. at 541 (“[D]eath penalty statutes 
[must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an 
arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.”). 
100 State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1351 (Conn. 1994). While the Connecticut 
Supreme Court has been willing to consider claims that the Connecticut constitution 
provides broader protection to capital defendants than the federal Constitution, 
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which was structured as a three-tiered pyramid where each tier 
narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants.101  
The “first tier” of the statute required a bifurcated sentencing 
proceeding for those found guilty of a capital felony.102 The “second 
tier” required the sentencing authority to find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, at least one statutory aggravating factor.103 Finally, the “third 
tier” required the trier to assess, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the existence of any mitigating factors.104 A defendant could be death-
eligible only if at least one aggravating factor and no mitigating 
factors existed, or if the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating 
factor; otherwise, if the mitigating factor outweighed the aggravating 
factor, the death penalty was disallowed.105 Thus, Connecticut’s three-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“those claims rarely have been successful.” State v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094, 1140 
(Conn. 2011). 
101 Ross, 646 A.2d at 1350.  
102 Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(b) (2011)). 
103 Id. (citing GEN. § 53a-46a(b), (e), (f), and (h)). 
104 Id. (citing GEN. § 53a-46a(e)). 
105 Connecticut has the sentencing authority weigh aggravating with mitigating 
factors as follows:  
(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of 
the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the 
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and (3)(A) no 
mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist 
but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in 
subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death. 
(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of 
the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the 
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists, or (3) one or 
more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and 
one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more 
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the 
one or more mitigating factors, the court shall impose a sentence 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. 
See GEN. § 53a-46a(f)-(g); see also Ross, 646 A.2d at 1350-51 (citing GEN. 
§ 53a-46a(f)). 
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tiered pyramid sought consistency by narrowing the pool of death-
eligible defendants in the first two tiers and individualization by 
considering mitigating factors in the third and final tier. These pre-
repeal sentencing procedures were retained in Connecticut’s 2012 
prospective repeal.106 And, because the Connecticut Supreme Court 
found that this capital sentencing structure achieves consistency and 
individual consideration before, it might make the same finding today. 
But the U.S. Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia also left a 
door open, as  
“each distinct [capital punishment] system must be examined on an 
individual basis.”107 Just because a sentencing system is structured 
like that of Georgia in Gregg does not mean it would inevitably 
satisfy Furman. Thus, while Connecticut’s pre-2012 three-tiered 
pyramid was intended to prevent arbitrary and capricious death 
sentences, it is now operating within an entirely different context—a 
post-repeal system in which eligibility for capital punishment turns on 
whether an offense was committed on or before the arbitrary date of 
April 25, 2012. Death penalty proponents could argue that before 
April 25, 2012, capital offenders were on notice that death was a 
possible sentence. 108  But if the death penalty was repealed in 
Connecticut precisely because it was arbitrarily and capriciously 
imposed, then why hold onto a vestige of that dysfunctional 
system?109  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 2012 Conn. Pub. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.) (under “Public Act No. 12-5”), S.B. 
280 § 5, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. 2012 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_nu
m=280&which_year=2012&SUBMIT1.x=13&SUBMIT1.y=5&SUBMIT1=Normal 
(amending subsection (a) of § 53a-46a of the General Statutes). 
107 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
108 See Dortch v. State, 110 A.2d 471, 476-77 (Conn. 1954). 
109 The death penalty was repealed because lawmakers found it hypocritical for 
the state to “conclude that violence is a deterrent to violence and that it could make 
the point that killing is wrong by killing,” especially when “the death penalty in the 
State of Connecticut has at various times been described as arbitrary, biased, 
capricious, random, haphazard, discriminatory and disparate, among other things.” 
CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., CONN. S. SESSION TR., April 4, 2012, 2012 SESS. 44 (2012), 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/trn/S/2012STR00404-R00-TRN.htm 
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2. Proportionality II: Special Classes of Offenders and Offenses 
The second way to analyze proportionality examines certain 
classes of offenders (e.g. children and the mentally disabled) and 
offenses (e.g. non-homicide crimes) and categorically bans sentencing 
practices that mismatch the culpability of a class of offenders with the 
severity of a penalty.110 In these types of cases, the Supreme Court 
looks to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society.”111 The Court also exercises its general judicial 
discretion to determine whether a given punishment could be 
justified. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[hereinafter CONN. S. TR.] (statements by Senator Eric D. Coleman). Additionally, 
proponents argued that “the death penalty does not bring finality,” as the cost of 
maintaining death row and the litigation that follows a death sentence “plac[e] a 
tremendous burden on . . . [the state’s] law enforcement and … public defenders.” 
CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., CONN. H.R. SESSION TR., APRIL 11, 2012, 2012 SESS. 46-47 
(2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/trn/H/2012HTR00411-R00-
TRN.htm [hereinafter CONN. H.R. TR.] (statement by Representative Gerald Fox 
III). Thus, “by eliminating the death penalty we’re not letting any guilty person go 
free, but we are making sure that we do not execute anyone who is innocent,” for no 
one can deny that “the criminal justice system makes mistakes.” CONN. S. TR., 
supra note 109, at 279 (statement by Senator Gayle S. Slossberg).  
110 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (finding life 
without parole unconstitutional for juvenile homicide offenders); see Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (finding life without parole unconstitutional for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) 
(invalidating the death penalty for a crime “where the victim’s life was not taken”); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty where 
the offender was under 18 years old at the time of the offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (invalidating the death penalty for the mentally disabled); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (invalidating the 
death penalty for those who committed an offense while they were under  16-years-
old); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (finding the death penalty 
disproportionate to the offense of aiding and abetting a robbery during which a 
murder was committed if the offender did not himself or herself kill, attempt to kill, 
or intend to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (finding the death 
penalty disproportionate punishment for rape of an adult woman). 
111 See, e.g., Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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i. Evolving Standards of Decency 
Because defining punishment involves a moral judgment, the 
Eighth Amendment’s scope is not static, and the suitability of a 
punishment for certain people “must change as the basic mores of 
society change.”112 Evolving standards of decency are measured by 
“objective indicia” of society’s standards, as expressed by state 
legislation and sentencing practices.113 Thus, to determine whether a 
class of offenders should be categorically excluded from receiving the 
death penalty, the Court would analyze whether other states 
demonstrate a national consensus against that sentencing practice.114 
For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court found a national 
consensus against making the crime of rape punishable by death.115 
Here, in the case of Connecticut, the prospective death penalty 
repeal created a class consisting of those who committed a capital 
offense before April 25, 2012. But the Supreme Court would likely 
find no national consensus against capital punishment of such a class 
because more than half (thirty-two) of the states and the federal 
government continue to employ capital punishment against similar 
offenders. 116  Also, as previously discussed, New Mexico and 
Maryland’s legislatures recently enacted similar prospective 
repeals.117 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 382 (1972) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
113 Graham, 560 U.S. at 62 (“[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” 
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312)); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420; Roper, 
543 U.S. at 563; Coker, 433 U.S. at 600; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
114 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64.  
115 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422-26. 
116 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 3; Number of 
Executions by State and Region, supra note 5. Here, “similar offenders” refers to 
adult capital offenders who are not mentally disabled, and who do not otherwise 
belong to a group of offenders that is specifically exempt from capital punishment. 
117 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 3. 
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On the other hand, just because most states actively use capital 
punishment does not necessarily mean that most states agree with 
carrying out death sentences after the repeal of capital punishment.118 
Likewise, the prospective repeals in New Mexico and Maryland do 
not show significant national consensus for the practice of 
maintaining death row after repeal. And, the very repeal of 
Connecticut’s death penalty could itself constitute sufficient 
consensus against capital punishment, as nothing precludes the Court 
from measuring consensus within a state instead of on a national 
scale.  
Nonetheless, the Court has cautioned that “[c]onsensus is not 
dispositive.”119 The Court also looks to jury behavior as another 
“objective index of contemporary values” because juries are so 
directly involved in each case.120 Since the prospective repeal in 2012, 
one Connecticut jury re-sentenced a defendant to capital 
punishment.121 But, in the Astorga case in New Mexico, after weeks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 49 (“[T]hat many jurisdictions do not expressly 
prohibit the sentencing practice at issue is not dispositive because it does not 
necessarily follow that the legislatures in those jurisdictions have deliberately 
concluded that such sentences would be appropriate.”). 
119 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
120 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 439-40 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
121 The defendant, Richard Roszkowski, has been on death row since 2009. The 
original 2009 verdict of death was vacated later that year due to errors during the 
penalty phase of the trial. The new penalty proceeding, completed in 2014, ended 
with a renewed verdict of death. State v. Roszkowski, No. FBTCR06218479T, 2014 
WL 279567, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2014); Jeff Cohen, Despite Death 
Penalty Repeal, Conn. Hands Down a Death Sentence, NPR (June 14. 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/06/14/321670966/despite-death-penalty-repeal-conn-
hands-down-a-death-sentence; see also  Randall Beach, Joshua Komisarjevsky Sent 
to Death Row for Deeds of ‘Unimaginable Horror and Savagery’ in Cheshire 
Slayings, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://nhregister.com/articles/2012/01/27/news/doc4f22f2e2ea7d0712572476.txt; 
Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-
states-1977-2008#2010 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014); 2012 Sentencing, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2012-sentencing (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2013).  
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of hearings and days of deliberations, the sentencing jury could not 
unanimously agree to sentence Astorga to death, and so the jury 
sentenced him to life in prison.122 A sentencing jury in Connecticut 
could likewise choose to impose life in prison without parole, despite 
the continuing availability of the death penalty. 
ii. Justification of Punishment and Culpability 
Because “the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
remains [the Court’s] responsibility,”123 the Court also evaluates the 
proportionality of capital punishment to a class of offenders based on 
its general exercise of judicial discretion.124 This exercise of general 
discretion weighs the culpability of offenders with the severity of 
punishment. 125  In its inquiry, the Court considers “whether the 
challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”126 
As the Court stated in Gregg:  
[T]he Eighth Amendment demands more than that a 
challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary 
society. The Court also must ask whether it comports 
with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of 
the Amendment . . . [any] sanction imposed cannot be 
so totally without penological justification that it 
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.127 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Astorga Will Not Be Put to Death, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 18, 2012, 4:16 
PM), http://www.abqjournal.com/107496/abqnewsseeker/astorga-jurors-express-
concern-for-their-safety.html. Federal juries have also been more inclined in recent 
years to impose life without parole instead of death. Seelye, supra note 6. 
According to one study, since 2000, juries have favored life over death by a ratio of 
two to one. Id. 
123 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 575 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (noting that the Court will also look to its own 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s “text, history, meaning, and purpose”). 
125 Graham, 560 U.S. at 67; Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
126 Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.  
127 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (internal citations omitted). 
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Likewise, in Furman the Court reasoned that a severe 
punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it is unnecessary:  
The infliction of a severe punishment by the State 
cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing 
more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there 
is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to 
achieve the purposes for which the punishment is 
inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and 
therefore excessive.128  
So, what is the Connecticut legislature’s justification for 
continuing the death penalty for some, but not for others? The Gregg 
Court reasoned that the death penalty is “said to serve two principal 
purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective 
offenders.”129 Of these two purposes, retribution is more likely to 
“contradict the law’s own ends,” especially in capital cases, because 
“[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent 
into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency 
and restraint.”130 
In Connecticut, executing the eleven on death row cannot be 
justified under a theory of deterrence. Anyone who commits a capital 
offense after April 25, 2012 could not be deterred because he or she 
would not be eligible for capital punishment. Thus, under Gregg, 
retribution is likely the main justification for maintaining death row.  
In debates over the repeal, Connecticut legislators cited 
retribution as justification for capital punishment. One representative 
stated, “I am for the Connecticut death penalty because it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
129 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. In addition to retribution and deterrence, the Court 
also recognizes isolation and rehabilitation as proper justifications of punishment. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
130 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 420 (2008). 
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retribution which accomplishes justice.”131 Another stated, “I continue 
to be hung up on the thought that this State made a promise to the 
families of the 11 people on death row, and we made a promise to the 
victims’ families that those villains would receive the death penalty, 
and I truly believe we are breaking that promise by the passage of this 
bill.”132 Similarly, another stated, “this debate shouldn’t be about 
emotions. . .. [i]t’s about retribution. It’s about justice . . . .”133 
But is retribution alone enough to justify execution? In Gregg, 
the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that retribution alone could justify 
capital punishment in Connecticut: “Retribution is no longer the 
dominant objective of the criminal law, but neither is it a forbidden 
objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of 
men.”134 The Court elaborated further:  
[R]etribution is part of the nature of man, and 
channeling that instinct in the administration of 
criminal justice serves an important purpose in 
promoting the stability of a society governed by law. 
When people begin to believe that organized society is 
unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders 
the punishment they “deserve,” then there are sown the 
seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and 
lynch law.135  
And, with social conditions differing from state to state, the 
Court in Gregg chose not to second-guess the Georgia legislature’s 
justifications for capital punishment:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131CONN. H.R. TR , supra note 109, at 82 (statement by Representative Lawrence 
Cafero). 
132 Id. at 365-66 (statement by Representative Penny Bacchiochi).  
133 Id. at 224 (statement by Representative Christopher Davis).  
134 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84 (internal citations omitted).  
135 Id. at 183 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. 239, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation omitted). 
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In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia 
Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary 
in some cases is clearly wrong. Considerations of 
federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a 
legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, 
the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and 
its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in 
the absence of more convincing evidence, that the 
infliction of dea[th] as a punishment for murder is not 
without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally 
severe.136 
The Court would probably defer to the Connecticut legislature 
in the same way because the Court has never required a state to have 
more than one justification of punishment.137 Thus, the Court could 
find that retribution alone is enough justification to continue capital 
punishment in Connecticut.138 
Also, with respect to culpability, the Court might not treat 
Connecticut’s eleven death row inmates as a special class of 
offenders, like it treats children and the mentally disabled, because 
these groups are fundamentally different. The Supreme Court has held 
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Id. at 186-87. 
137 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“[P]unishment is 
justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, 
and retribution.”) (emphasis added). 
138 In Furman, Justice Marshall made a compelling argument in dicta that 
punishment for the sake of retribution alone was prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment “if the ‘cruel and unusual’ language were to be given any meaning” 
and that the Court’s recognition of retribution as a justification for punishment 
“does not mean that retribution may then become the State’s sole end in punishing.” 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 343-44 (Marshall, J., concurring). Otherwise, “all penalties 
selected by the legislature would [by] definition be acceptable means for 
designating society’s moral approbation of a particular act” and the cruel and 
unusual language would be read out of the Constitution. Id. at 344 Despite this 
argument, the Court today still might defer to the state legislature if it finds that the 
death penalty could serve an isolation function. Id.  
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of sentencing”139 because their immaturity and underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility, susceptibility to negative influences, and the 
transitory nature of their personality reduce their culpability, and it 
would be “misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of 
an adult[.]” 140 Because juveniles have diminished culpability, the 
Court reasoned that the death penalty was not justified, noting that 
“the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult.”141 Similarly, the Court has held that having a mental disability 
diminishes personal culpability even if the offender can distinguish 
right from wrong because he or she “ha[s] diminished capacities to 
understand and process information . . . to abstract from mistakes and 
learn from experience, [and] to engage in logical reasoning . . . .”142 
This diminished capacity weakens the case for retribution and makes 
it less likely that the death penalty will have a deterrent effect.143 
While the Supreme Court expanded the Eighth Amendment to 
protect minors144 and the mentally disabled from execution,145 it would 
probably not do so for the eleven adults on death row in Connecticut, 
whose culpability or blameworthiness did not lessen after the repeal. 
And, because the heart of the retribution rationale relates a given 
sentence directly to an offender’s blameworthiness, the Court would 
likely defer to the state legislature’s judgment that maintaining death 
row has retributive value in Connecticut.146 
For these reasons, under this second proportionality analysis, 
the Supreme Court would probably not find that death is a punishment 
“mismatched” to the eleven inmates on Connecticut’s death row. No 
national consensus or pattern of jury verdicts contradicts such a 
practice, though the Court could measure consensus within the state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
140 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
141 Id. at 571. 
142 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 305, 318 (2002). The Court further noted that 
“[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they 
do diminish their personal culpability.” Id. at 318. 
143 Id. at 318-19. 
144 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
145 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
146 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010). 
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as well. Retribution alone might justify the punishment, and since the 
inmates’ mental capacities are more developed than children and the 
mentally disabled, their culpability is fundamentally different.  
B. The Politics of Repeal 
1. A Compromise Statute: From Veto in 2009 to Approval in 
2012 
Connecticut’s prospective death penalty repeal was largely a 
result of political maneuvering. 2012 did not mark Connecticut’s first 
attempt to prospectively repeal the death penalty.147 In 2009, the state 
senate and house of representatives—both led by Democrats—
approved a bill that would have eliminated capital punishment for 
crimes committed on or after the bill’s effective date but Governor M. 
Jodi Rell vetoed it.148 A two-thirds vote by both houses would have 
overridden the veto, but the initial senate vote to pass the bill was so 
close (19 to 17) that overcoming the veto was not even attempted.149 
Only three years later, the state’s judiciary committee again 
introduced and approved a bill that replaced Connecticut’s death 
penalty with life in prison without parole in all future cases.150 In 
April 2012 the senate passed the bill (20 to 16).151 Less than a week 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Rell Vows to Veto Ban on Death Penalty in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/nyregion/connecticut/23death.html 
[hereinafter Rell Vows to Veto]. Six times in the last twenty years, Connecticut’s 
House of Representatives debated whether to continue the death penalty. See CONN. 
H.R. TR, supra note 109, at 82 (statement by Representative Lawrence Cafero). 
148 Press Release, State of Conn. Exec. Chambers, Governor Rell Vetoes HB 
6578, An Act Concerning the Penalty for a Capital Felony (Jun. 5, 2009), available 
at http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=3675&Q=441204; Rell Vows to 
Veto, supra note 147. 
149 See Rell Vows to Veto, supra note 147. The bill passed 90 to 56 in the house.  
150 Substitute for Raised S.B. No. 280, Session Year 2012, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_nu
m=280&which_year=2012&SUBMIT1.x=13&SUBMIT1.y=11&SUBMIT1=Norm
al (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (under “Bill History”). 
151 Connecticut on Track, supra note 38.  
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later, the house also voted in favor of repeal (86 to 62).152 On April 
25, 2012, Governor Dannel P. Malloy signed the bill into law.153 
What had changed just three years after the 2009 veto? In the 
interim three-year period, defendants Steven J. Hayes and Joshua 
Komisarjevsky were convicted and sentenced to death for the 
gruesome, highly publicized 2007 home invasion and triple murder of 
a mother and her two daughters in Cheshire, Connecticut.154 The 2009 
veto had occurred amidst the immediate publicity surrounding the 
Cheshire murders, and a repeal bill never even made it to the senate 
floor in 2011 while one of the two defendants was still facing trial.155  
After both men were sentenced to death, some conservative 
legislators concerned with keeping “the worst of the worst . . . similar 
to Mr. Hayes, similar to Mr. Komisarjevsky” on death row continued 
to support capital punishment and “absolutely disagree[d] with . . . the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 See Applebome, supra note 17. 
153 See generally 2012 Conn. Pub. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.) (under “Public Act No. 





154 Connecticut on Track, supra note 38. Defendants killed the suburban mother 
and her two daughters, ages 17 and 11, after holding them hostage in their home and 
raping two of the three. Applebome, supra note 17. Defendants also beat the girls’ 
father and set the house on fire. Id. The father managed to survive and has since 
vehemently advocated for Connecticut to keep its death penalty. Id. Hayes and 
Komisarjevsky were sentenced to capital punishment on November 10, 2010 and 
December 9, 2011, respectively. William Glaberson, Death Penalty for 2nd Man in 
Connecticut Triple-Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/nyregion/joshua-komisarjevsky-gets-death-
for-cheshire-killings.html?ref=petitfamily; William Glaberson, Death Penalty for a 
Killer of 3 in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/nyregion/09cheshire.html. 
155 Connecticut on Track, supra note 38. In 2011, the repeal bill’s passage was 
undermined after two senators reversed their votes. State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 
696 (Conn. 2012) (Harper, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Those two 
senators revealed that they had changed their votes out of sympathy for one victim 
of the Cheshire murders. Id. 
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notion that the death penalty has no purpose.”156 Others who had 
previously opposed death penalty repeal in 2009 flipped to support 
the 2012 bill. For example, one senator who had opposed repeal in 
2009 supported the 2012 bill because she could not “stand the thought 
of being responsible for somebody being falsely accused and facing 
the death penalty . . . .[because] mistakes are obviously made[.]”157 
Still, many were on the fence. As a condition of their support, 
conservative lawmakers insisted that the repeal be prospective only: 
[I]t seems pretty clear to many of us that there are 
people in the Legislature who feel strongly about a 
prospective bill before us. . . . And that some . . . have 
stated publicly that the only way that they could 
support the death penalty bill before us is if, in fact, 
they have assurances that those who are on death row 
are not affected by this prospective look in 
legislation.158 
For some legislators still reeling from the recent Cheshire 
murder trials, retroactive repeal was never on the table: “[L]et’s talk 
about Hayes and Komisarjevsky. Let’s . . . get right to it, because . . . 
there’s no political will to abolish the death penalty because of those 
two recent trials and those folks on death row right now.”159  
 Thus, to gain the support of those on the fence, bill proponents 
argued that the death penalty repeal would be unambiguously 
prospective.160 The senate also amended the repeal bill so that inmates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 CONN. S. TR., supra note 109, at 52-53 (statements by Senator John Kissel). 
157 Connecticut on Track, supra note 38 (statement by Senator Edith G. Prague). 
158 CONN. S. TR., supra note 109, at 169 (statement by Senator Michael 
McLachlan). 
159 See id. at 51 (statement by Senator John Kissel). 
160 See id. at 169 (statement by Senator Michael McLachlan that the repeal 
“draws a very clear, distinct line” and “states very clearly to the court what the 
intention of this Legislature is. And frankly, [it states] what is the intention of those 
who were on the fence with repeal of the death penalty and feel very strongly that if 
it are [sic] to be prospective it must not interfere with those on death row . . . So, if 
among my fellow Senators here tonight, there are those who feel . . .. that in fact, we 
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receiving life sentences under the new law would face harsh prison 
conditions replicating those on death row, “including separate 
housing, noncontact visitation and mandated cell movement every 90 
days.”161  
Connecticut’s current death penalty policy sets a double 
standard. It is designed to retaliate against the Cheshire murderers and 
others now on death row. Capital punishment and life without parole 
are each per se constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.162 But, 
prospective repeal—while a step in the right direction—creates an 
inconsistent standard that weakens the law: “If it is the will of this 
chamber that this state is no longer in the business of executing 
people, then let’s say it and do it. You cannot have it both ways.”163  
Prospective repeal is an unsatisfying compromise precisely 
because “the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind 
rather than degree.”164 The term “evolving standards of decency” 
suggests that capital punishment may change over time, or differ from 
state to state. But the problem with evolving standards is that too 
many standards now exist, and prospective repeal only further 
complicates the issue. Instead, in the decent treatment of human 
beings there should be one uniform standard with respect to the death 
penalty. In other words, if “[e]volving standards of decency must 
embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person,” 165 then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
must not interfere with the tried, convicted and sentenced cases on death row, then I 
urge you to support this amendment tonight.”). 
161 Connecticut on Track, supra note 37. The amendment aimed to “exactly 
mirror the conditions for those prisoners on death row.” Connecticut Senate Votes to 
Abolish Death Penalty, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, 8:22 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/connecticut-senate-votes-abolish-death-
penalty-article-1.1056500?localLinksEnabled=false. 
162 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (death penalty per se 
constitutional); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (mandatory life 
without parole per se constitutional). 
163 Applebome, supra note 17 (statement by House Republican Lawrence Cafero 
Jr.).  
164 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 90 (2010) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 294 (1983)).  
165 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
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only one standard should exist, and the death penalty should be 
completely abolished. 
2. Wielding Legislative Intent 
From its inception, the constitutionality of Connecticut’s 
prospective repeal was an issue for state lawmakers on both sides of 
the political spectrum. 166 Opponents to the bill predicted endless 
appeals on the issue.167 Even bill proponents admitted they were 
concerned about whether the new law would pass constitutional 
muster.168 To quiet these concerns, proponents cited New Mexico’s 
prospective repeal and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dortch. 169  As discussed above, however, no authority actually 
guarantees the prospective repeal’s constitutionality. 
With constitutionality left up to the courts, the Connecticut 
legislature made its intent clear because, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
has noted, legislative intent matters: 
[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a 
democratically elected legislature against the 
constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We 
may not require the legislature to select the least severe 
penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not 
cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime 
involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who 
would attack the judgment of the representatives of the 
people. This is true in part because the constitutional 
test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See generally CONN. S. TR., supra note 109. 
167 Connecticut on Track, supra note 38   
168 CONN. S. TR., supra note 109, at 57 (statement by Senate Democrat Eric D. 
Coleman).  
169 See id. at 59 (statement by Senator Eric D. Coleman referencing a 1951 case 
known as Dortch).  
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standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily 
in ascertaining such standards.170 
In other words, defining punishment is peculiarly a question of 
legislative policy because “in a democratic society legislatures, not 
courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the 
moral values of the people.”171 Thus, the Court exercises extreme 
caution before overturning a state penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment because such a decision “cannot be reversed short of a 
constitutional amendment,” and would therefore shut off “[t]he ability 
of the people to express their preference through the normal 
democratic processes, as well as through ballot referenda[.]”172 
A court would easily find that the Connecticut legislature 
intended for the repeal to be prospective. For instance, Section 38 of 
the repeal bill cross-references and incorporates the provisions of 
Sections 1-1 and 54-194 of Connecticut’s General Statutes.173 Section 
1-1, subsections (t) and (u) of Connecticut’s General Statutes provide:  
(t) The repeal of an act shall not affect any punishment, 
penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes 
effect, or any suit, or prosecution, or proceeding 
pending at the time of the repeal, for an offense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976); accord Williams v. Illinois, 399 
U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (“A State has wide latitude in fixing the punishment for state 
crimes.”).  
171 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-76 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 
(1972).   
172 Id. at 176. 
173 Section 38 of the session law provides: “The provisions of subsection (t) of 
section 1-1 of the general statutes and section 54-194 of the general statutes shall 
apply and be given full force and effect with respect to a capital felony committed 
prior to the effective date of this section under the provisions of section 53a-54b of 
the general statutes in effect prior to the effective date of this section.” 2012 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.) (under “Public Act No. 12-5”), S.B. 280, 2012 Gen. 
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committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or 
forfeiture incurred under the act repealed. 
(u) The passage or repeal of an act shall not affect any 
action then pending.174 
Additionally, Section 54-194 provides that the “repeal of any 
statute defining or prescribing the punishment for any crime shall not 
affect any pending prosecution or any existing liability to prosecution 
and punishment therefor, unless expressly provided in the repealing 
statute.”175 
 The explicit incorporation of these two savings clauses into 
the death penalty repeal means that a new penalty does not change 
prior penalties given. The incorporation of these provisions “may add 
nothing to the underlying bill, but it certainly takes nothing away. At 
best, if a court were to look and have some question whether 
[legislators] really meant this to be prospective, this removes any 
doubt,” and adds “belts and suspenders” to the legislature’s intent that 
the bill be prospective, not retroactive.176 
In addition to the statute itself, legislative history underscores 
the legislature’s prospective intent. As one senator stated, “the intent 
of this amendment and this bill is to very clearly be prospective in 
nature. I want to make the declaration that this bill is intended to be 
prospective and to have no retroactive application at all.”177 Similarly, 
one representative noted that “[t]he bill expressly states that the 
penalty is prospective. I believe and I expect that the intent—the 
legislative intent, as we leave this chamber, as well as was clearly 
stated in the Senate, is that, yes, the legislation is intended to be 
prospective.”178 
Overall, the Connecticut legislature’s intent that the repeal be 
prospective is made explicitly clear from both the incorporation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1 (t)-(u) (1949). 
175 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-194 (1949). 
176 CONN. S. TR., supra note 109, at 233 (statement by Sen. John McKinney).  
177 Id. at 58 (statement by Democratic Sen. Eric D. Coleman).  
178 CONN. H.R. TR., supra note at 73 (statement by Rep. Gerald M. Fox III). 
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Sections 1-1 and 54-194 in the legislation and from legislative debates 
leading up to the repeal. The presumption that legislatures have wide 
latitude to set the punishment for state crimes would place a court 
under enormous pressure to uphold the Connecticut repeal under the 
Eighth Amendment.179 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court could uphold Connecticut’s prospective 
death penalty repeal under the Eighth Amendment. Under the first 
line of proportionality analysis, the Court could find that the state’s 
death penalty statute aims to achieve consistent, individualized 
sentences. But if the death penalty was repealed in Connecticut 
precisely because it was arbitrarily and capriciously imposed, holding 
onto a piece of that broken system is counterintuitive. Under the 
second line of proportionality analysis, the Supreme Court might not 
find that capital punishment is mismatched to the eleven inmates on 
Connecticut’s death row. Even if no national consensus supports or 
contradicts continuing the death penalty after repeal, the Court would 
probably not treat the death row inmates as a less culpable class like 
children or the mentally disabled, who are exempt from capital 
punishment. Retribution alone might be enough to the Court to justify 
capital punishment.  
The intent of the Connecticut legislature also puts significant 
pressure on courts to uphold the repeal under the Eighth Amendment. 
And the legislature made its intent clear—Connecticut wanted 
prospective repeal. Still, the results are imperfect. If a court upholds 
the prospective repeal, a double standard of decency and only partial 
abolition of capital punishment remains.180 If a court strikes it down, 
not having the bargaining chip of prospective repeal may make it 
harder for other states to abolish the death penalty in the first place. 
Also, instead of severing only the prospective provisions, there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970). 
180 The inmates on death row could attempt to have their death sentences 
commuted. In Connecticut, this would be handled by the governor-appointed Board 
of Pardons & Paroles. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-124a (2010). 
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risk that the court could strike down the entire act—which could, in 
turn, reinstate the death penalty in the state—yet another issue of 
concern, albeit one that goes beyond the scope of this argument.181  
While a sign of progress, prospective repeal is not ideal policy. 
The Court could uphold Connecticut’s prospective repeal under the 
Eighth Amendment, but it does not have to. After all, “[j]udicial 
review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and 
legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires.”182 
Put simply, death is different. The Eighth Amendment requires that 
courts both review the law, and bar certain punishments, “whether 
legislatively approved or not.”183 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 See Seals v. Hickey, 441 A.2d 604, 612 (Conn. 1982) (“[W]here a portion of 
the statute is invalid, the valid part can stand only if it and the invalid part are not so 
mutually connected and dependent as to indicate a legislative intent that they may 
be inseparable.”). 
182 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 313-14 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).  
183 Id. at 314. 
